This study examines the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency of publicly listed companies in two emerging markets and analyzes corporate disclosure practices as a function of specific firm characteristics. The analysis uses the disclosure and transparency scores extracted from a survey instrument designed to rate disclosure practices of publicly listed companies by using the OECD Corporate Governance Principles as an implicit benchmark. Empirical results show that financial characteristics explain some of the variation in the degrees of corporate disclosure for firms in Hong Kong but not for firms in Thailand. Further, corporate governance characteristics, such as board size and board composition show more significant associations with the degrees of corporate disclosure in Thailand than in Hong Kong. The results are broadly consistent with the notion that good corporate governance leads to better corporate disclosure and transparency in less developed markets. 
Introduction
Recently, considerable attention has been focused on the corporate disclosure and transparency in East Asia. The financial crisis of 1997 that swept through most of East Asia has highlighted the need of financial and governance reforms in the region. Currently, experts generally agree that the main failing leading to the financial crisis stemmed directly from the lack of disclosure and obscure management practices. Consequently, there are numerous corporate governance reform initiatives including regional (PECC 2001) and international (OECD 2004) efforts focusing on improvement of disclosure standards and transparency of corporate information. The main reason for the emphasis on disclosure standards and transparency is that disclosure and transparency are the twin cornerstones to protecting shareholders' rights. Shareholders should be treated equally, should be able to participate in the decisions affecting the firm, and should be able to elect directors to represent them. Outside investors need to be assured no individual shareholder (or group of shareholders) receives preferential treatment or has influence greater than their respective share of ownership. Finally, shareholders should also be able to exert their influence over the board of directors and hold directors liable for breaches of their fiduciary duty. Only through full and complete disclosure and transparent management practices can shareholders feel confident that the firm to which they have given their funds is being operated with their best interests in mind.
To date, the literature has been focusing mostly on examining corporate disclosure and transparency from a macro perspective. Ball (2001) contends that corporate disclosure infrastructure evolves as a function of the country's economic, legal, and political infrastructure. Consequently, the key research objective has been to understand crossnational differences among countries. For example, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) investigate corporate transparency across 45 countries worldwide and conclude that corporate transparency is a function of a country's legal/judicial regime and political economy. Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) examine disclosure practices of companies and find an association between disclosure and firm size, performance, and legal origin. They also conclude that cross-border economic interactions are associated with similarities in disclosure and governance practices. Examining corporate financial disclosure in emerging markets, Salter (1998) documents a relation between corporate financial disclosure and economic sophistication and capital market development. He also finds that levels of corporate disclosure positively relates to prior levels of regulation and the ability to draw foreign portfolio investments. Archambault and Archambault (2003) develop a model predicting levels of corporate disclosure as a function of culture as well as national political and economic systems. From the empirical results, they conclude that corporate disclosure decisions are quite complex and influenced by a number of national and corporate factors. In the end, this line of investigation has enriched our knowledge of the determinants of corporate disclosure across different markets.
This study makes several contributions to the growing literature on corporate disclosure. The main focus is on investigating variation of degrees of corporate disclosure within individual markets. Currently, the literature uncovers cross-national determinants of corporate disclosure and implicitly assumes that there should be little variation in degrees of corporate disclosure among firms listed in the same market. In other words, as all firms exist in the same national environment, all firms simply comply with local regulations and act according to the local institutional environment. The underlying assumption is that there should be little discernible difference among firms with respect to degrees of corporate disclosure. This study attempts to address this underlying assumption in two Asian emerging markets, Hong Kong and Thailand. These markets are selected because of increasing concern over the quality of corporate disclosure in the region since the Asian financial crisis, marked by the de facto devaluation of the Thai currency in mid-1997. More importantly, the reason Thailand and Hong Kong are chosen for this study is because of the contrasting experience since the onset of the financial crisis. Thailand encountered the most severe economic collapse in the country's history as a result of the Asian financial crisis. On the other hand, Hong Kong went through the crisis with relative ease and did not experience an economic meltdown of the scope and scale as Thailand. Further, the reason for choosing Hong Kong is that Hong Kong is an international financial center in Asia with an AngloSaxon legal system. Corporate governance in Hong Kong is considered to be more advanced than other Asian markets. Most experts would agree that the development of corporate governance in Thailand is far behind that of Hong Kong. For instance, Ho (2000) posits that corporate disclosure and transparency for listed companies in the Thai stock market tend to be lower than listed companies in Hong Kong. Moreover, both equity markets are dominated by a family-controlled business environment, characterized by high family ownership of listed corporations. In the end, comparing and contrasting two markets in the same region that have quite different characteristics should yield additional insights to the issue of corporate disclosure and transparency.
Another unique aspect of this study is that it makes use of a unique data set compiled by the Institutes of Directors in both Hong Kong and Thailand. Based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the survey instrument for measuring corporate disclosure quality was developed by the Thai Institute of Directors Association with technical assistance from McKinsey and Company in 1999. The latest version of the survey contains 86 questions that are classified into five categories: the rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and the role of board of directors. This study extracts survey questions that are directly related to degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. Most importantly, the measurement of corporate disclosure with this instrument represents an improvement from the instruments commonly used in other studies. For example, prior studies typically gauge the presence or absence of material being disclosed but often overlook the qualitative aspects of disclosure. Studies frequently award one mark for the presence and zero for the absence of an item of information in the annual report and accounts of firms (for example, S&P disclosure scores).
In contrast with prior work, this study recognizes and rewards both the quantity and quality of information disclosed for each criterion. For instance, for a given survey item, a company will receive credit for disclosure if an item is indeed disclosed in accordance with the minimum legal requirement (average). Should a company provide information beyond the legal minimum, approaching the level of international standards or best practice, their disclosure and transparency practices will be rewarded (excellent). Each firm will receive a score indicating the level of corporate disclosure. This more complete measure can provide a qualitative indication of transparency and disclosure practices which is superior to prior work that focuses only on the quantity or the presence of information.
The third and final aim of this study is to examine individual firm characteristics that are associated with the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency within each market.
Although the literature has identified several cross-national determinants of corporate disclosure, little has been done to determine factors that affect corporate disclosure and transparency within an economy. It is hypothesized that determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency can be categorized into two groups. The first group consists of financial variables whereas the second group consists of corporate governance characteristics. It is predicted that some financial characteristics can influence the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency of a firm. For example, large firms may be more willing to disclose relevant information to the public than small firms. Financial variables, such as profitability, financial leverage, and efficiency are included in this study. At the same time, some governance characteristics can also affect the degrees of disclosure and transparency. This study investigates notable governance characteristics such as ownership concentration, board size and board composition.
The empirical findings offer compelling evidence that levels of corporate disclosure and transparency vary significantly within each of the two Asian markets. From the overall degrees of disclosure scores, it appears that the levels of corporate disclosure in Thailand are higher than in Hong Kong. This finding contradicts the notion that firms in more developed markets tend to have better information disclosure than firms in less developed markets.
Empirical results also show that the financial characteristics of firms tend to exhibit a significant association with the degrees of disclosure in Hong Kong but not in Thailand.
Specifically, large and profitable firms in Hong Kong tend to have high degrees of disclosure.
Hong Kong companies with high asset turnover and financial leverage also tend to have high degrees of disclosure. These results are not evident among Thai firms. On the other hand, corporate governance characteristics tend to exhibit strong associations with degrees of disclosure among Thai firms. Specifically, Thai companies with high proportions of outside directors and large boards tend to have high degrees of disclosure. Interestingly, the proportion of executive directors represented on the board is negatively related to degrees of disclosure in both markets. It is conjectured that in more developed markets, financial characteristics are more relevant to degrees of disclosure while in less developed markets, corporate governance characteristics are more relevant. Finally, the empirical finding from this study suggests that aggregate examination of the determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency across different economies with different institutional setting may lead to inaccurate conclusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses disclosure practices in Hong Kong and Thailand. In Section 3, determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency are proposed along with testable hypotheses. Data and methodology are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 presents and discusses empirical findings and Section 6 concludes the study.
Corporate Disclosure Practices and Transparency
The focus of this study is the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) define corporate transparency as the availability of firm-specific information to outside investors and stakeholders. Furthermore, they argue that the availability of information is critical to resource allocation decisions and economic growth. Apparently, the levels of corporate transparency depend on the levels of information disclosure exhibited by the firm. As a result, corporate disclosure and transparency are the twin cornerstones to protect shareholders' rights. Shareholders should be treated equally,
should be able to participate in the decisions affecting the firm, and should be able to elect directors to represent them. Finally, outside investors need to be assured no individual shareholder (or group of shareholders) receives preferential treatment or has influence greater than their respective share of ownership. Additionally, shareholders should also be able to exert their influence over the board of directors and hold directors liable for breaches of their fiduciary duty. Only through full and complete disclosure and transparent management practices can shareholders feel confident that the firm to which they have give their funds is being operated with their best interests in mind.
The rest of this section discusses corporate disclosure practices and related corporate governance issues in Hong Kong and Thailand. While the conclusion drawn is that the overall corporate governance environment in Hong Kong is much better than in Thailand, the differences between levels of corporate disclosure and transparency remain to be examined.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) posit that firms in markets with a higher level of legal protection and corporate governance are associated with better performance. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) also find strong evidence supporting the importance of corporate governance with respect to the financial performance of firms during the financial crisis. Durnev and Kim (2003) In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, weak corporate governance practices intensified the severity of the problems Thai companies faced. It became readily apparent that corporate governance practices at many Thai firms did not match international standards.
Expectations stemming from the basic tenets of corporate governance such as accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment, transparency, vision, and ethics could not be met. In the seven years since the financial crisis erupted, corporate governance practices and reforms are now mainstream discussion topics. The Thai government named 2002 the "Year of Good
Governance", spearheaded by a national corporate governance committee chaired by the Prime Minister. Representatives from ministries, regulatory bodies, the exchange, and industry representatives all participate. Thai regulators and institutions implemented accounting and auditing reforms and standards, toughened disclosure rules, and strengthened the professional bodies guiding the accounting and auditing profession.
Perhaps the most significant changes that came in the wake of the Asian financial crisis concern disclosure and transparency, as the practical aspects have been greatly strengthened.
The stockholders select the external auditors and audited financial statements must be released in a timely fashion. Penalties for non-compliance with the disclosure rules are stiff, and the authorities make public the names of violators. SEC and SET laws and rules clearly spell out the penalties for violating the rules governing listed companies in the areas of insider trading and price manipulation. Although insider trading is punishable with fines, blacklisting, and imprisonment, only recently have there been severe sanctions from the regulators.
Existing rules carefully spell out the type and frequency of information that companies are required to disclose. With additional regulations and a renewed emphasis on enforcement, companies are providing more information in a more timely fashion. For example, SET regulations state that listed companies must publish their financial statements within 60 days of the end of the fiscal year and produce an annual report within 110 days.
Non-compliance with disclosure rules carries significant penalties
The pace of corporate governance reform in Thailand has been much slower than other countries. Thai institutions have not been radically overhauled and restructured; changes have come more gradually. Recently, both regulators, the SEC and the SET, have expanded the legal frontiers. New and updated rules, new and revised laws, and increased regulatory oversight have been at the forefront of the push for increased corporate governance and increased enforcement of existing laws and regulations. This has resulted in a drastic improvement in terms of corporate disclosure and transparency among public companies.
Determinants of Corporate Disclosure and Transparency
It is hypothesized that there are two broad categories of firm characteristics that can affect the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency within a market. The first category consists of financial characteristics of the firm while the second category consists of corporate governance characteristics of the firm. There is some indirect evidence in support of the conjecture. Based on factor analysis results, for example, Bushman, Piotroski, and
Smith (2003) isolate these two factors from a range of measures capturing firm-specific information environments for a number of countries. In the end, they also find that the two categories of factors, financial characteristics and governance characteristics, are related to countries' legal regimes and political economies. Based on this finding, this study also proposes financial variables and governance variables as possible determinants of the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency within each market.
A. Financial Characteristics
Five financial variables are proposed in this study, intending to capture different firm characteristics that can influence the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. The financial variables used in this study are as follows:
Firm Size. It is hypothesized that large firms are more transparent than small firms. A possible explanation is that large firms have larger investor bases than smaller firms and attract more attention from analysts. Large firms also have more resources to provide better disclosure to investors than small firms. In a cross-country study, Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) find a positive relation between market capitalization and overall transparency scores. Archambault and Archambault (2003) document an inconsistent association between firm size, as measured by total assets, and total disclosure score. it can also be argued that companies with more assets in place have little need to disclose financial information. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that collateral assets can reduce agency conflicts because lenders can take possession of fixed assets in case of bankruptcy.
The reduction in agency conflicts may reduce the need to disclose information so it is possible that there is a negative relation between collateral values and the degrees of disclosure.
Asset Utilization. It is possible that companies with high levels of asset utilization may have higher degrees of corporate disclosure than those with low levels of asset utilization.
The reason is that firms with high levels of asset utilization may attract more investors and analysts. Therefore, these companies have to disclose more relevant information to outside investors which, in turn, leads to high levels of corporate disclosure and transparency for companies with high levels of assets utilization. Shirking, excessive perks, and non-optimal investments are examples of abusive actions by managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . The board of directors can reduce agency conflicts by exercising its power to monitor and control management (Fama and Jensen 1983) .
B. Corporate Governance Characteristics
Independent outside directors are presumed to carry out the monitoring function on behalf of shareholders to ensure that management is in place and to maximize shareholders' interests because shareholders themselves would find it difficult to exercise control due to the wide dispersion of ownership of common stock (John and Senbet 1998) . It is contended that outside board members should be independent of the executive management and free from any business or other relationships with the company that could compromise their autonomy. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that including outside directors as professional referees not only enhances the viability of the board but also reduces the probability of top management colluding to expropriate shareholder wealth. The generalization of this effective monitoring argument is that the more independent the outside directors serving the board, the higher the firm performance.
Empirical evidence, however, has been quite inconsistent with regard to the positive impact of board composition on firm performance (Bhagat and Black 1998) . Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) document significant positive stock returns around announcements of appointments of outside directors. Several studies also obtain indirect evidence in support of the positive impact of outside directors (Weisbach 1988; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 1996; Baysinger and Butler 1985) . Using a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 1999 , Limpaphayom and Sukchareonsin (2003 find a positive relation between board composition and firm market valuation.
Contrary to the argument that outside director incentives are better aligned with the interests of shareholders, several studies suggest that outside directors may not necessarily act in the interests of shareholders since CEOs often dominate the director nomination process (Mace 1986 ). In addition, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) suggest that outside board members are capable of becoming entrenched in the form of unchecked deployment of corporate assets or transactions favoring management. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) point out a possibility that outside directors are appointed as a result of political rather than monitoring reasons. In the end, they document a negative relation between board composition and firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) observe that a high proportion of independent directors on the board does not always predict better future accounting performance. Thus, the entrenchment view predicts a negative relation between board composition and firm performance.
In this study, it is hypothesized that board composition may also affect the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. The reason is that independent directors may wish to disclose more information to benefit other stakeholders of the firm. This can lead to a positive relation between the proportion of outside directors and the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. There are two variables indicating board composition being used in this study. The first variable is the proportion of independent outside directors in the company's board. The second variable is the proportion of executive directors or insiders represented on the board of directors. It is predicted that executive directors may have a conflict of interest and wish to conceal information from outside investors. Consequently, the proportion of executive directors may have a negative impact on the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency.
Board Size. The other crucial characteristic of the board of directors is its size. When considering the size of the board, there is a trade-off between additional value-added expertise or monitoring benefits and disadvantages stemming from the coordination problem.
Jensen (1993) posits that larger board size leads to less candid discussion of critical issues which, in turn, leads to poor monitoring. In the end, Jensen (1993) contends that the optimal size of the board is eight members. Yermack (1996) finds a positive relation between board size and firm value among large firms in the US. Huther (1997) examines a sample of US public utilities and find that the board size negatively affects firm efficiency. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) find a significant negative correlation between board size and profitability in a sample of small-and medium-sized Finish and Swedish firms. Given the literature, it is hypothesized that there may be a relation between board size and the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency.
Data and Methodology
The sample consists of a total of 337 Thai firms and 168 Hong Kong firms listed on the stock exchanges of the respective countries. In order to be included in the study, a firm must The data used in the evaluation process are drawn from a wide variety of publicly available information such as annual reports, Securities and Exchange Commissions and stock exchange filings, annual shareholders' meeting minutes, articles of association, company by-laws, and company websites. To reinforce the emphasis on disclosure and transparency, the research team assumed the viewpoint of an outside investor. Publicly available documents were the source documents as this information would also be readily available to outside investors.
Each company was scored in all applicable areas of the survey. While assessing the level of corporate governance for an individual company can be subjective, the survey is designed to minimize this problem. In addition to crosschecking and auditing by different raters, nearly every survey measure has been refined so as to be quantifiable. This is also a unique feature of this study, as previous research has only checked for the presence of a specific corporate governance measure. This study adds to the existing literature as adds a qualitative dimension to the governance measures. Companies that omit or do not comply with a specific scoring criterion receive a 'poor' score. Meeting the legal compliance standard earns a firm a score of 'fair', while firms that exceed the regulatory requirements and/or meet international standards receive the highest score.
Question A3 ("How is the remuneration of the board presented?") can serve as an example. A company that does not show any pertinent information in any of the public documentation with regard to remuneration to board members will receive a "poor" rating. If board remuneration is presented in aggregate (e.g., for the last fiscal year, the total board compensation was 20 million baht), this company will get a "fair" rating. Finally, a company that provides detailed information on board remuneration (e.g., compensation paid to each individual, classified as salary, bonus, and fees) will receive an "excellent" rating. Another example is Question B4 (Does the company provide rationales/explanations for related-party transactions affecting the corporation?). A company will get a "poor" rating if there are no explanations of related party transactions or any documentation available in public sources.
A "fair" rating will be given to firms that provide brief explanations of those transactions (e.g., transactions are done at fair market values). However, firms that provide detailed information (e.g., identity of the related parties, the nature of the transactions, the transaction amounts and dates) will be awarded an "excellent" rating. To maintain objectivity and consistency, the criteria for each question are determined by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives from the stock exchanges and securities commissions.
Once the assessment is complete, a simple average of the scores for all questions in a section yields the score for that section. 
There are five independent variables indicating the financial characteristics of the firm whereas there are four independent variables indicating corporate governance characteristics of the firm. The variables calculated are described as follows. Three different measures of SIZE are used: SIZE1 is the natural logarithm of total assets; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of sales; and SIZE3 is the logarithm of market value, defined as price per share times number of shares outstanding at the end of 2002. Two measures of firm performance or profitability,
PROFIT, are incorporated into the analyses: return on assets (ROA) is net income divided by total assets and Q is a proxy of Tobin's Q calculated as the sum of fiscal year-end market value and long-term debt divided by total assets. Other control variables are TURNOVER, sales divided by total assets; FIX, the amount of fixed assets net of depreciation divided by total assets; and DEBT, which is total liabilities divided by total assets.
Shareholding data for the ownership concentration variable (CONC) is taken from the annual reports as well, using the information available in the annual reports. In Thailand, firms are legally required to list the shareholdings of the ten largest owners, while Hong
Kong firms list only the five largest shareholders. As this level of ownership information is disclosed to investors and readily available, the proportion of outstanding shares owned by five largest shareholders is used as the ownership concentration variable. Board characteristics are taken from firms' annual reports. The number of directors (BSIZE) describes the total size of the board. Directors are classified as executive directors (company employees), independent directors (no company affiliation), and non-executive directors (not a company employee, but may have an affiliation with the firm, its owners, or managers).
The variable BEXC is the percentage of executive directors on the board while OUTSIDE is the percentage of independent directors on the board.
In addition to the regression estimations for each country, a pooled regression analysis will be performed on both data sets. A dummy variable indicating firms from Thailand is included in this final model to test the hypothesis on the difference in degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency between firms in Hong Kong and firms in Thailand. Table 1 shows a comparison of the survey scores for Hong Kong, Thailand, and the pooled sample results, giving an overview of how companies in the two countries compare.
Empirical Results
For each survey question, the mean, maximum, minimum and difference between country means are shown. For each survey question, Table 1 also includes results of a t-test for the difference between the mean responses from each country. From the results, it is concluded that the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency for Thailand firms are significantly higher than those for Hong Kong firms. This is inconsistent with the notion that the levels of corporate disclosure and transparency are higher in a more developed market such as Hong Kong, which is perceived to have a better environment for corporate governance. Table 1 Here or exceed all international standards, the rating would be three; the poorest practices would be uniformly rated as one.
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Insert Table 2 Here Board composition is also quite different when comparing the figures from both countries. Though the average board size is nearly the same (a mean of 10.6 directors for Hong Kong versus 11.5 for Thailand), the composition is markedly different. Hong Kong boards have a majority of executive directors on average (mean of 56%, with a high of 85% and a low of 17%). In contrast, executive directors at Thai firms constitute a much smaller percentage of the board, with an average value of 23%, ranging from a maximum of 67% of the board down to a low of 0%. The mean percentage of independent directors on boards (OUTSIDE) in both countries is identical at 30%. The ranges are similar as well: a maximum of 67% to a minimum of 13% for Hong Kong compared with a 73% and 11% respectively for Thai firms.
The results from the regression analyses are presented in Table 3 to Table 5 , with eighteen separate regressions shown. Three separate determinants of firm size (SIZE1, SIZE2, and SIZE3) as well as two separate performance measures (ROA and Q) mean that six models are created for a combined (pooled) sample in addition to each country. Table 3 shows six models for a combined sample of firms from both countries. Results in Table 4 show six models for Hong Kong while Table 5 displays the models for Thailand. The results of the regression models will be first examined by looking at the pooled regressions, then by individual country, followed by a discussion of the cross-country similarities and differences.
Insert Table 3 Here Table 3 While the results from the pooled regression show that there is a relation between the level of disclosure and transparency and some of the variables in question, a question remains whether or not the pooled regressions are representative of the results for the individual countries. Given the notable differences with respect to corporate governance and market structure between Thai and Hong Kong firms, are we seeing the whole story? This question can be answered by examining the relation in each country separately. Table 4 Here ---------------------------------- Turning to the individual country regressions, Table 4 shows that the results for Hong Kong are largely consistent across the all models. All models are statistically significant, with values for adjusted R-squared ranging from 23% to 29%. Regression coefficients for all three measures of size are positive and significant at the one percent level in all regressions.
The conclusion is that, for Hong Kong firms, the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency is an increasing function of firm size. In other words, large firms tend to disclose more information and have more transparency. Looking next at the measures of firm performance, none of the coefficients for ROA are statistically significant in any regression model. On the other hand, the regression coefficients for Q are statistically significant in two of the three regressions. The results perhaps imply that the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency is not clearly related to accounting performance but related to a marketbased measure of expected future performance like Tobin's Q. The coefficients for a measure of asset utilization (TURNOVER) are positive and statistically significant in four of the six regressions, showing that the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency are positively related to a measure of asset utilization. In a similar vein, the coefficients for FIX are positive and statistically significant in every regression. The conclusion is that firms with high values of collateral tend to have high degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency.
The coefficients for DEBT, however, tell a slightly different story as none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Overall, it appears that a number of financial variables are indeed related to the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency for Hong Kong firms.
For governance variables, the results are not as strong as the results for financial variables. For instance, the level of ownership concentration as measured by the percentage of the firm owned by the top five shareholders is not related to disclosure and transparency as the regression coefficients for ownership concentration (CONC) are not statistically significant in any regression. Also, the regression coefficients for board size (BSIZE) are not significant in any regression, leading to the conclusion that the size of the board has no association with the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. Further, the regression coefficients for OUTSIDE, the percentage of independent directors, are not significant in any regression for Hong Kong firms. For all regressions for Hong Kong firms, the only variable that exhibits a relation with the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency is the proportion of executive directors represented on the board. The regression coefficients for BEXC, the percentage of executive directors on the board, are negative and statistically significant at least at the ten percent level in every model. The negative coefficients indicate that the degree of disclosure and transparency falls as the percentage of executive directors on the board increases. Firms with executive directors making up a smaller percent of the board have greater disclosure and transparency. The conclusion is that one specific aspect of board composition has an influence on the level of disclosure and transparency by Hong Kong firms. Table 5 Here
Overall, the empirical results for Thailand shown in Table 5 Further, coefficients for the performance measures (ROA and Q) are not statistically significant in any regression either. Coefficients for the other firm characteristic variables which cover turnover, the level of fixed assets, and leverage (TURNOVER, FIX, and DEBT) are not statistically significant in virtually every regression. The coefficient for DEBT is negative and significant at the ten percent level but only in one regression using Q as the performance measure. The conclusion is that for Thai firms, the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency is independent of size, firm characteristics, and firm performance. In other words, financial characteristics appear to have no association with the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency.
The most interesting results for Thai firms appear when examining the governance variables. Although the regression coefficients for ownership concentration (CONC) are not statistically significant in any regression for Thai firms, the regression coefficients for board size (BSIZE) are positive and statistically significant for every regression for Thai firms.
This implies that larger boards have a positive effect on the levels of corporate disclosure and transparency. Further, the regression coefficients for the percentage of executive directors (BEXC) are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level for every regression.
The conclusion is that insider-dominated boards are less transparent and less likely to disclose information to outsiders. Lastly, the regression coefficients for the percentage of independent directors (OUTSIDE) are positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level for every regression for Thai firms. A larger concentration of independent directors, therefore, is associated with greater degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency. This finding highlights the benefits of having independent directors on the board of directors, representing all outside investors.
To compare and contrast the findings across both countries, in general, the levels of corporate disclosure and transparency appear to be related to selected financial characteristics of companies in Hong Kong. Specifically, the levels of disclosure and transparency are positively related to measures of firm size, asset utilization, collateral values, and, to some degree, market performance among Hong Kong companies, but not for Thai companies.
Interestingly, the accounting performance measure (ROA) does not show a significant association with the levels of disclosure and transparency of firms in either country. It appears that financial variables are more related to the degree of disclosure and transparency in Hong Kong but not in Thailand.
The finding for corporate governance variables provides a different conclusion.
Although ownership concentration does not affect the level of disclosure for firms in either country, other corporate governance characteristics show significant association with the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency. For instance, board size seems to have no influence on the level of disclosure and transparency for Hong Kong firms, but a positive influence for Thai firms. Furthermore, board composition has a notable influence in Thailand. For Thai firms, the proportion of independent directors also affects the degree of corporate disclosure and transparency. In other words, more independent directors mean greater levels of disclosure and transparency. By far the most significant finding concerns the presence of executive directors (insiders) on the board in both countries. It is found that the percentage of executive directors on the board positively affects levels of disclosure and transparency. More managers (insiders) on the board mean lower disclosure and less transparency. This finding, observed for both Hong Kong and Thailand firms, is consistent the idea that owner-managers have superior information about firm prospects and are less inclined to share information with outsiders.
Finally, the differences between the pooled regression results and individual country regressions indicate that an examination of the determinants of corporate disclosure and transparency across different economies with different institutional settings may lead to inaccurate conclusion.
Conclusions
By examining the degrees of corporate disclosure and transparency of publicly listed companies in Hong Kong and Thailand, this study shows that corporate disclosure practices vary significantly within a market and are clearly a function of specific firm characteristics.
While the results from these two emerging markets have some similarities, the differences are quite pronounced. The dependent variable is TRANSP, an index of disclosure and transparency constructed from corporate governance surveys conducted in both Thailand and Hong Kong. SIZE1 is the natural logarithm of total assets; SIZE2 is the natural logarithm of sales; and SIZE3 is the logarithm of market value, defined as price per share times number of shares outstanding at the end of 2002. ROA is net income divided by total assets and Q is the sum of market value and long-term debt divided by total assets. TURNOVER is sales divided by total assets. FIX is the amount of fixed assets, net of depreciation, divided by total assets. DEBT is total liabilities divided by total assets. CONC is a measure of ownership concentration, representing the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the top five shareholders. BSIZE is the size of the board of directors and BEXC is the percentage of the board that is made up of executive (inside) directors. OUTSIDE is percentage of the board that is made up of independent directors. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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